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NEBRASKA'S FAIR TRADE ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Eighteen years ago the Nebraska Legislature enacted a Fair 
Trade Act1 "to protect trade-mark owners, producers, wholesalers 
and the general public against injurious and uneconomic prac-
tices" in the distribution of trade-marked commodities. The Su-
preme Court of Nebraska recently found it necessary in McGraw 
Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co.,2 to hold the act in viola-
tion of the constitution of Nebraska and the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss and evaluate the 
McGraw Electric case with primary emphasis on the yardstick 
used by the court in determining unconstitutionality. The anti-
trust issue will be discussed even though it is of minor importance 
since the particular holding of the McGraw Electric case in rela-
tion to anti-trust law is almost unique. 
I. THE COURT'S YARDSTICK OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
In the McGraw Electric case, the plaintiff, an Illinois manu-
facturer and distributor of trade-marked toasters, signed retail 
price maintenance agreements with two Nebraska retailers pur-
suant to the Nebraska Fair Trade Act.3 Defendant, a non-signer,4 
with knowledge of the agreements, advertised and offered for 
sale the trade-marked toasters at a price less than the minimum 
fixed by the agreements. Plaintiff sought an injunction and 
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-1101 to 59-1108 (Reissue 1952). 
2 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608, supplemental opinion, 160 Neb. 319 
(1955). Companion case, General Electric Co. v. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 
139 Neb. 736, 68 N.W.2d 620 (1955). 
3 Neb. Laws c. 136 (1937). The title of the act provides: "AN ACT 
to protect trade-mark owners, producers, wholesalers and the general 
public against injurious and uneconomic practices in the distribution of 
competitive commodities bearing a distinguishing trade-mark, brand or 
name through the use of voluntary contracts establishing minimum re-
sale prices and providing for refusal to sell such commodities unless 
such minimum re-sale prices are observed .... " 
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1105 (Reissue 1952) provides: "Willfully and 
knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at 
less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to 
the provisions of sections 59-1101 to 59-1108, whether the person so 
advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such con-




damages. The trial court, denying the injunction, declared the 
act invalid. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed on the 
grounds that, notwithstanding the validity of the act under the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it violated (1) 
the constitution of Nebraska in that it grants special privileges 
and immunities, deprives persons of libert·.t antl property witlwut 
due process of law, and confers upon persons the power to fix 
and enforce prices without imposition of standards; and (2) the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
A. The Historical Basis of Fair Trade Legislation 
In 1935 Illinois passed a Fair Trade Act which was similar 
in all material respects to Nebraska's present act. Seagrams 
Distillers Corporation, a wholesale dealer in alcoholic beverages, 
entered into retail price maintenance agreements with a number 
of Illinois retailers pursuant to the act. Old Dearborn Distri-
buting Company, a non-signer, with knowledge of the agreements, 
sold the trade-marked beverages at a price less than the minimum 
fixed by the agreements. Seagrams sought an injunction against 
this violation of the Fair Trade Act. Old Dearborn defended on 
the grounds that the act denied due process of law and violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
United States Supreme Court, in Old Dearborn Distributlng Co. v. 
Seagrams Distillers Corp./' sustained the constitutionality of the 
act. 
G 299 U.S. 183 (1936). The United States Supreme Court held that 
an owner of property cannot be denied the right to fix the price at 
which he will sell it, and that this "is an inherent attribute of the prop-
erty itself, and as such within the protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments." Id. at 192. As to the nonsigner clause, the Court said: 
"The essence of the statutory violation ... consists not in the bare dis-
position of the commodity, but in a forbidden use of the trade-mark, 
brand, or name in accomplishing such disposition. The primary aim of 
the law is to protect the property-namely, the good will-of the pro-
ducer, which he still owns. The price restriction is adopted as an appro-
priate means to the perfectly legitimate end. and not as an end in itself." 
Id. at 193. The Court found that Fair Trade Acts do not fix prices, nor 
delegate power to private persons, but only permit certain persons to 
contract with regard to resale prices. The Court found no violation of 
due process since the acts were not unreasonable and arbitrary in their 
purpose of protecting the property right which the trade-mark owner has 
in his good will. The Court buttressed its decision on due process by 
adopting the concept that the retailers acquired the commodities with 
knowledge of the then existing price restrictions imposed by the resale 
agreements and by the statute, and that their voluntary acquisition of 
the property with such knowledge carried assent to the resale prices so 
known to be fixed. The Court also found the trade-mark owner's prop-
erty right in his good will a reasonable basis for classification between 
trade-marked commodities and those not trade-marked, and consequently 
found no violation of equal protection of the laws. 
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Since Old Dearborn, there has been little doubt that fair 
trade legislation is constitutional within the meaning of the due 
process clause of the Federal Constitution. There is less harmony, 
however, in the application of Old Dearborn by the state courts 
to state constitutional provisions.6 
For example, in Old Dearborn, the Court said: 
There is a great body of fact and opinion tending to show that 
price cutting by retail dealers is not only injurious to the good 
will and business of the producer and distributor of identified 
goods, but injurious to the general public as well. . . . True, 
there is evidence, opinion and argument to the contrary; but it 
does not concern us to determine where the weight lies. We 
need say no more than that the question may be regarded as fairly 
open to differences of opinion. The legislation here in question 
proceeds upon the former and not the latter view; and the legisla-
tive determination in that respect, in the circumstances here dis-
closed, is conclusive as far as this coU1·t is concerned. Where 
the question of what the facts establish is a fairly-debatable one, 
we accept and carry into ef feet the opinion of the legislature.1 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The plaintiff in the McGraw decision argued that the Old Dear-
born case sustained his contention that the Nebraska act was in 
the public interest and did not run afoul of constitutional pro-
hibition. The Nebraska court, however, rejected this argument, 
and countered by using Old Dearborn as an authority for invalid-
ating the act by saying: 
It is true that in the opinion there the court did arguendo in 
strong language indicate a conviction that such state legislation 
was constitutional. 
This however was not the issue decided by the United States 
Supreme Court. The issue decided there was that of whether 
or not the constitutionality of such legislation was a matter for 
determination by the state through its legislature and its courts 
or by the United States Supreme Court. It was held that this 
was a question for determination by and within the state, and 
6 See Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida Limited, 209 Ga. 613, 
75 S.E.2d 161 (1953) (Georgia Fair Trade Act held violative of both the 
due process clause of the state constitution and the supremacy clause of 
the Federal Constitution) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sport-
ing Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952) (Michigan Fair 
'frade Act held violative of the due process clause of the state constitu-
tion and an excessive exercise of the police power); Liquor Store, Inc. 
v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949) (Florida Fair 
Trade Act held an excessive exercise of the police power). 
1 299 U.S. 183, 195 (1936). 
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in clear terms accepted the determination by the state on that 
basis.S (Emphasis supplied) 
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It would appear that the United States Supreme Court in 
Old Dearborn decided the only issue which was before it, namely, 
whether the Illinois Fair Trade Act contravened the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenfh Amendment. And 
it would appear from the language of the Court quoted above, 
that the same Court was deciding the issue of legislative versus 
judicial prerogatives rather than state versus federal preroga-
tives as assumed by the Nebraska court. For these reasons, it 
is submitted that the Nebraska court erred in their interpretation 
and application of Old Dearborn, the backbone of present day 
fair trade legislation. 
B. Nebraska Standards of Constitutionality 
In establishing a yardstick of constitutionality in the instant 
case, the Nebraska court relied heavily on its previous decisions 
in Nelson v. Tilley9 and Boomer v. Olsen.10 An analysis of these 
two cases, however, adds little to the perplexing problem of 
whether particular legislation is within constitutional limitations. 
For example, the Tilley case concerned the validity of an 
act which regulated the licensing of motor vehicle dealers and 
the sale of motor vehicles.11 Even though two minor subsections 
of the act were held to be invalid, the court upheld the remaining 
portions of the statute on the ground that the regulation was 
within the public interest and a valid exercise of the police power. 
The court said : 
Whatever the personal views of this court may be as to the 
necessity of such legislation, the fact remains that the legisla-
ture of the state concluded that a reasonable basis existed for 
its enactment and, there being some foundation in fact to justify 
legislative action, this court is powerless to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the legislature, even if it cared to do so.12 
However, it was held in the McGraw Electric case that the 
legislature had failed to express in the act "an indication of rec-
ognizable public interest"13 and for this reason the court was 
Sl\IcGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 720, 
68 N.W.2d 608, 617 (1955). 
9137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939). 
10 143 Neb. 579, 10 N.W.2d 507 (1943). 
11Neb. Comp. Stat. §§ 60-901 to 60-919 (Supp. 1937). 
12Nelson v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 332, 289 N.W. 388, 392 (1939). 
131\IcGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703. 
720 ,68 N.W.2d 608, 617 (1955). 
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"unable to find an escape from the conclusion that such a grant 
of power is unconstitutional and therefore void."14 Since every 
possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute,15 and 
since there can be little doubt that there was some reasonable 
foundation in fact to justify this legislation,16 it would appear 
that the Tilley case strongly supports the plaintiff's contentions, 
yet the case was used almost exclusively to deny his contentions. 
The Olsen case was the culmination of litigation concerning 
a statute which attempted to impose a maximum amount which 
employment agencies might charge their clients.17 The statute 
was first attacked on the ground that the legislature was attempt-
ing to regulate a business not affected with a public interest.18 
The Nebraska court unanimously held that the statute was con-
stitutional under the Nebraska constitution since employment 
agencies were affected with a public interest. However, the court 
felt compelled to strike down the statute as conflicting with the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States on the basis of Ribnik v. McBride,19 
which held that employment agencies were not affected with a 
public interest. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States the Nebraska decision was reversed and remanded on the 
grounds that the Ribnik case was no longer authority and that 
employment agencies were affected with a public interest.20 
At this point the litigants had a unanimous decision by the 
Nebraska court that the statute was constitutional under the Ne-
braska constitution and a unanimous decision by the United States 
Supreme Court that the statute was constitutional under the 
Federal Constitution. The next step taken by the opponents of 
the statute was to institute a new state court action contending 
this time not that there was a lack of power in the legislature to 
fix maximum fees for employment agencies, but that the parti-
cular fee set in the statute was confiscatory. The opponents were 
at last victorious and the statute was held invalid under the Ne-
braska constitution since the provision fixing the maximum fees 
H Id. at 721, 68 N.W.2d 617. 
Hi Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 
Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d 477 (1948). 
10 See quotation cited supra note 7. 
11 Neb. Comp. Stat. § 48-508 (1929). 
1s State ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 
574, 293 N.W. 393 (1940). 
19 277 U.S. 350 (1928). 
20 Olsen v. State of Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 
313 U.S. 236 (1941). 
NOTES 103 
to be charged by such employment agencies was unreasonable, 
prohibitory and confiscatory. The court concluded the opinion 
by saying: 
We also hold that a private employment agency is not a 
business in which the public has such an interest that price fix-
ing may properly be included as a method of regulat1on under 
the provisions of our Constitution.21 
The court was confronted with an analogous situation in de-
termining the validity of the Nebraska Unfair Sales Act,22 which 
declared loss-leader sales unlawful. This act has been considered 
by the court in two cases, State ex rel. English v. Ruback,23 and 
Hill v. Kusy.24 In the Ruback case the plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion on the grounds that the defendant had sold coffee at less 
than cost in violation of the act. The defendant, among other 
things, argued that the act violated the due process clause since 
it tended "to fix prices in businesses not clothed with a public 
interest." In invalidating the act, the court said : 
The preliminary question now presented, in view of the es-
sential nature of the transactions involved, is a mere sale of 
groceries, a transaction in no manner affected with a public in-
terest.!15 
In the Kusy case, decided after the act had been amended, the 
plaintiff sought an injunction on the grounds that the defendant 
had sold cigarettes at less than cost in violation of the act. The 
defendant argued denial of due process. In this case the act was 
upheld, the court saying: 
In the exercise of and within the limits of its police power, 
the Legislature may forbid that which it deems to be an exist-
ing evil and it may limit its prohibitions to the matters which in 
its judgment menace the public welfare.26 
It is to be noted with interest that the court in the latter case 
assumed that such business enterprises were affected with a 
public interest. It is difficult to understand why the sale of 
groceries in the first case is "in no manner affected with a public 
interest," whereas the sale of cigarettes some eleven years later 
in the second case is clothed with such a public interest that "the 
21 Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 587, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1943). 
22 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-1201 to 59-1206 (Reissue 1952). 
23135 Neb. 335, 281 N.W. 607 (1938). 
24150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949). 
25 State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 340, 281 N.W. 607, 
609 (1938). 
26 Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 657, 10 N.W.2d 594, 597 (1949). 
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Legislature may forbid that which it deems to be an existing 
evil."27 
Whether it is possible to establish a workable yardstick of 
constitutionality is of course questionable. And it would appear 
that the only standard at the present time is that standard set 
forth in the Tilley case where the court said: 
The balance between due process and the police power is 
therefore more or less unstable, as it must necessarily keep pace 
with the economic and social orders.2s 
II. THE EFFECT OF THE MCGRAW DECISION ON FUTURE 
TRADE LEGISLATION 
Other problem~ in the instant case are: (1) whether the 
end of the legislation is prohibited by the due process clause; and 
(2) whether the means authorized by the legislature violates the 
due process clause. In other words, does the McGraw decision pre-
vent the legislature from imposing any type of control in future 
legislation, or does it merely prevent the legislature from using 
delegation to private parties to affect such controls. 
It is difficult to determine from the opinion the answers to 
21 The Ruback and Kusy cases presented another aspect to the general 
problem of determining yardsticks. In the Ruback case the act was held 
invalid for vagueness because the elements of the conduct which the act 
attempted to define and punish were so vaguely expressed that the ordi-
nary person could not determine in advance a course of lawful conduct. 
In the Kusy case, decided after the act had been amended, the act was 
upheld, the court holding that mere difficulty of application in the pro-
cesses of litigation is not enough to enable a court to say that a statute 
is unconstitutional. It is difficult to reconcile these two cases on this 
point in view of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1203 (Reissue 1952) which de-
fines the violation as follows: "Sales at less than cost; advertising, 
when unlawful. It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to sell 
or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less 
than cost as defined in this act, with the intent, or effect, of inducing 
the purchase of other merchandise, or of unfairly diverting trade from 
a competitor, or otherwise injuring a competitor, impair (sic) and pre-
vent (sic) competition, injure (sic) public welfare, and are (sic) unfair 
competition and contrary to public policy and the policy of this act, where 
the result of such advertising, offer or sale is to tend to deceive any 
purchaser or prospective purchaser, or substantially to lessen competition, 
or unreasonably to restrain trade, or to tend to create a monopoly, in 
any line of commerce." It would appear that this section is so vaguely 
expressed that the ordinary person could not determine in advance a 
course of lawful conduct, yet, the section was upheld as merely difficult 
of application. For an excellent article concerning the problems of "sales 
below cost," see Lovell, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price 
Fixing Under State Law, 57 Yale L.J. 391 (1948). 
2SNelson v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 331, 289 N.V\T. 388, 392 (1939). 
NOTES 105 
these important questions since the court discussed both ends2V 
and means.30 The inference which may be drawn from the court's 
discussion of unlawful means is that the end result, meaning some 
type of control, is lawful, since it can be argued that if the end 
control is unlawful, a discussion of the means to reach this un-
lawful end ·is unnecessary. That it is within the legislature's 
prerogative to enact some type of control is the reasonable in-
ference to be drawn from the court's discussion; this inference 
is also supported by the fact that the court has approved of 
numerous controls of similar business enterprises.31 It may be 
said, however, that the decision leaves these questions undecided 
and it is these questions which will concern legislators in drafting 
future trade legislation. 
III. THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 
Prior to Old Dearbo·rn, states were hesitant to pass fair 
trade legisla~ion since resale price maintenance agreements had 
been held violative of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,32 and there 
29 In discussing the issue of public interest in determining whether the 
legislation was within the police power, the court made the following 
statements: "It is impossible to draw from the act an indication of 
recognizable public interest to be served by the power which flows from 
section 59-1105. It is likewise impossible to draw any such indication 
from the title to the act." McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug 
Co., 159 Neb. 703, 720, 68 N.W.2d 608, 617 (1955). "It is trite to say 
that motive alone may not be accepted as a criterion for the determina-
tion of the constitutionality of legislative action. . . . The motive which 
induced the legislation does not and cannot become a check upon the 
power which is conferred by and inheres in the specific terms of the act." 
Id. at 720, 68 N.W.2d at 618. 
30 In discussing "means,'' the court said: "The question of whether 
or not legislation is in the public interest is ordinarily one for legislative 
determination, however it may not under the guise of regulation in the 
public interest impose conditions which are on their face unreasonable, 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or confiscatory." Id. at 720, 68 N.W.2d at 618. 
"There are no standards or requirements whereby contracting parties 
are obligated to conform to the claimed motivations or alleged purposes 
of the legislation. . . . Without any regard to these extraneously declared 
motives or purposes or any provision of the act, contracting parties may 
at will, with or without reason, arbitrarily, uncontrollably, or even cap-
riciously by mere fiat and notice apply the provisions of section 59-1105." 
Id. at 721, 68 N.W.2d at 618. 
31 See Motors Acceptance Corp. v. McLain, 154 Neb. 354, 47 N.W.2d 
919 (1951); Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949); Nelson 
v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939). 
32 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1952). Section 1 
of the act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of a 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several states ... is declared to be illegal .... " 
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was widespread doubt about the constitutionality of such legisla-
tion. Old Dearborn established its constitutionality and brought 
on a flurry of legislative activity which included congressional en-
actment of the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act.33 
To alleviate the effect of two court decisions which later had 
drained the Fair Trade Acts of most of their vitality, 34 Congress 
passed the McGuire Act.35 
The McGuire Act, which became law on July 14, 1952, elimi-
nated the federal anti-trust obstacle from fair trade legislation 
by declaring that the enforcement of resale price maintenance 
agreements, against both signers and non-signers, shall not be 
declared unlawful under any federal anti-trust act in states where 
fair-trade legislation is authorized. The Nebraska court, how-
ever, found it necessary in the McGraw decision to hold expressly 
that the Nebraska act violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
The reasoning to support this holding appears to be as fol-
lows: The Sherman Act, which declared contracts in restraint 
of trade in interstate commerce illegal, became law in 1890. The 
Nebraska act became law in 1937. The defendant argued that 
the Nebraska act was invalid at the time of its enactment since 
it was contrary to the Sherman Act as it then stood and was 
therefore repugnant to the supremacy clause of Article VI of the 
Constitution of the United States. The defendant further argued 
that since the act was invalid at the time of its enactment it con-
tinued to be invalid. Hence, the Miller-Tydings Amendment and 
the McGuire Act did not operate to validate the Nebraska act 
inasmuch as the act was void ab initio. In reply to this argu-
ment the Nebraska court said : 
In the Old Dearborn case it was pointed out substantially 
that though such state legislation as this was violative of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act it was not violative of the Constitution 
of the United States because thereof.313 
33 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1952). The Miller-
Tydings Amendment sanctioned resale price maintenance agreements in 
the fair trade states in transactions involving interstate commerce. This 
amendment was added as a proviso to section one of the Sherman Act. 
31- Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 394, re-
hearing denied, 341 U.S. 956 (1951), and Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 
F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), modified on rehearing, 192 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 
1951). 
3o 38 Stat. 719, (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). Act 
sustained in Schwegmann v. Eli Lilly Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953). 
30 l\IcGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb 703, 712, 
68 N.W.2d 608, 614 (1955). 0 
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It is interesting to note that the court did not e);.-pressly hold in 
the text of the opinion that the Nebraska Fair Trade Act was in 
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. However, the syllabus, 
which in Nebraska is prepared by the court and is to be taken as 
the true holding in the case, provides: 
The Fair Trade Aet is not violative of the Constitution of 
the United States but is violative of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
Whether the court relied solely on Old Dearborn for this 
holding, or partially sustained the defendant's void ab initio argu-
ment, is not known. The reasonable inference to be drawn from 
the opinion is that the act was void ab initio since it was repug-
nant to the supreme federal law as it then stood. This would 
appear to be the only way to prevent application of the Miller-
Tydings Amendment and the McGuire Act, which acts would oper-
ate to validate the Nebraska act on the anti-trust issue.37 The 
holding is even more confusing in view of the statement in a 
leading Nebraska case where the court said: 
The section of an act properly amended should be construed 
precisely as though it had been originally enacted in its amended 
form.38 
The courts of some twenty-six states have yet to pass on the 
validity of their fair trade laws. If the void ab initio argument 
discussed above is followed by these states, the acts passed prior 
to the Miller-Tydings Amendment would be totally void. Those 
acts passed subsequent to the Miller-Tydings Amendment but 
prior to the McGuire Act would be practically impotent for with-
out the benefit of the McGuire Act and the non-signers clause, 
the acts would not be enforceable. This result could hardly have 
been the intention of Congress in passing the Miller-Tydings 
Amendment and the McGuire Act. To this date, only one other 
court has used similar reasoning in invalidating their Fair Trade 
Act.39 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it is evident that the yardstick of con-
stitutionality used by the court is extremely difficult, if not im-
37 It is also interesting to note that neither the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment nor the :McGuire Act were cited or referred to in the opinion of the 
instant case. 
38 First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 91, 277 N.W. 762 767 (1938). 
39 Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida Limited, 209 Ga. 613, 75 
S.E.2d 161 (1953). 
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possible, to ascertain. The instant case adds little to the estab-
lishment of such a standard. And it is submitted that the real 
issue in the McGraw decision was the long standing controversy 
concerning the scope of legislative and judicial prerogatives. That 
this controversy will continue to produce unstable results can 
hardly be doubted. Yet it would seem, in the absence of work-
able standards, that the court, in deciding such controversial issues 
as raised in the instant case, would allow the opinion of the 
legislature to stand.4o 
Marvin L. Holscher, '56 
